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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A healthy child is so lovely a creature that I can well understand the reaction of 
one who asks: how could its birth possibly give rise to an action for damages? 
But every baby has a belly to be filled and a body to be clothed. The law relating 
to damages is concerned with reparation in money terms and this is what is 
needed for the maintenance of a baby.1 
 
 
Wrongful birth claims relate to the birth of a child as a consequence of medical negligence. There 
has been general acceptance by courts in various jurisdictions that costs relating to the 
pregnancy and birth may be recovered. However the more contentious issue is whether there is 
liability for the costs of rearing such a child. The English courts have held there is no such liability 
with respect to a healthy child, while in Australia, the Queensland Court of Appeal has taken the 
opposite view2. In New Zealand the issue has yet to be decided. The Accident Compensation 
scheme has limited the development of the law relating to personal injury in general, but the High 
Court has found that the scheme does not prevent claims for wrongful birth. It is argued that the 
New Zealand courts should follow the Australian decisions, as the English approach is based on 
the views of ordinary people on this moral question as perceived by judges. This requires the 
individual judge’s sense of the moral answer to a question to prevail, albeit in light of the judge’s 
view of the opinions of ordinary people. It is argued that this is a subjective approach in that, in 
such a complex and emotionally difficult area of the law, there is unlikely to be uniformity of 
opinion among the public, or even among judges. As such, this is arguably a matter better 
resolved by legislation than by the courts. 
 
                                                 
1  Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644, 666F ( Peter Pain J). 
2  Melchior v Cattanach [2001] Aust Torts Reps 81-591 (Qld SC), [2001] QCA 246 (26 June 2001, 
unreported BC 2001 03372)(Qld CA). However note that special leave to appeal has been granted by 
the High Court of Australia ((2002) 23(6) Leg Rep SL 1). 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper considers the various approaches that might be taken by the courts in New Zealand with 
respect to claims for wrongful birth. It considers the English decisions and contrasts them with 
judicial developments in Australia. It briefly outlines the decisions of the courts in other jurisdictions, 
such as the United States and Canada. The issue is whether the New Zealand courts should adopt 
the subjective approach of the judges in the House of Lords in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board3, 
or the arguably more principled approach of the Queensland Court of Appeal.4 There is discussion 
of the various arguments that have been suggested to justify decisions in this undeniably difficult 
area. 
 
Wrongful birth actions arise when a claim is made, usually by parents, that medical negligence has 
caused them to bear the burden of an unwanted child. The negligence may be a consequence of 
poor technique, or it may be a result of a failure to supply appropriate information, or it may be both. 
These cases most commonly relate to a failed sterilisation operation leading to the birth of a child, 
or a failed termination of pregnancy, leading to the continuation of the pregnancy. In both these 
situations the medical negligence was a substantial cause of the birth of a child.  
 
Alternatively, there may be failure to diagnose a pregnancy, so that the opportunity to seek a 
termination is lost. In this situation it cannot be claimed that the negligence directly caused the birth, 
as the woman would already be pregnant when she sought medical advice. Her claim is based on 
the premise that there has been a failure to provide information and that this failure deprived her of 
the opportunity to make a choice as to termination of the pregnancy. An essential aspect will be 
establishing that, had the pregnancy been diagnosed sufficiently early, she would have terminated 
it. 
 
Cases relating to the failure to provide information involve either lack of knowledge of the possibility 
that sterilisation might fail, and so the patient does not have the opportunity to chose to use 
alternative contraception, or cases where there has been a failure to advise of risks to the child. 
The essential feature of such a claim is that the patient would have made different choices if the 
risks had been explained. In such a case the patient has no wish to have a child at all.  
 
However in cases where a child is born with a disability and that disability was foreseeable, the 
child, whilst originally a wanted child, becomes a child from whom unwanted consequences and 
expenses will arise. The claim then relates to the additional burdens faced by the parents of a 
disabled child. The argument is that the medical practitioner should have foreseen the risk and 
should have advised the mother of it. As in cases relating to failure to diagnose a pregnancy, it must 
                                                 
3  [1999] 4 All ER 961. 
4  Melchior v Cattanach [2001] Aust Torts Reps 81-591 (Qld SC), [2001] QCA 246 (unreported 26 June 
2001, BC 2001 03372) (Qld CA). 
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also be shown that had she been adequately advised, the mother would have obtained a 
termination of the pregnancy.5 
 
Foreseeability is also relevant in determining the extent of the responsibility of the negligent doctor. 
If a sterilisation operation or termination is performed negligently, it is foreseeable that the woman 
will become or remain pregnant. The courts have, however, wrestled with the concept that the 
application of the principle of foreseeability should result in the doctor becoming liable for the costs 
of the child’s entire upbringing. It has been suggested that imposing such liability can be seen as 
subjecting the doctor to ‘a kind of medical paternity suit’.6 
 
In cases where the child born after a failed sterilisation has disabilities that were not foreseeable 
during the course of the pregnancy, it might be argued that liability for the costs of the upbringing, 
including the additional costs arising from the disability are not just. The doctor might argue it was 
fate and not the quality of medical care that lead to the disabilities. However, damages in 
negligence are assessed on the nature of the consequences of the negligence rather than the 
degree of culpability as minor negligence can foreseeably have far-reaching consequences.  
 
This paper will review the wide range of approaches taken by the courts to decide these admittedly 
difficult issues. Some cases have suggested a distinction between wrongful birth cases and failed 
sterilisation (or wrongful conception) cases.  In wrongful birth cases, the opportunity that is lost to 
the parents is the opportunity to terminate a pregnancy, which would have been available if the 
impugned professional services had not been negligently performed.7 However, in Groom v Selby8 
Hale LJ stated,9 ‘the principles applicable in wrongful birth cases cannot sensibly be distinguished 
from the principles applicable in wrongful conception cases.’ 
 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
Claims relating to failed sterilisation have been uncommon in New Zealand. As has been stated by 
Barker J, ‘[t]he law in New Zealand on damages for personal injury has rather stood still since the 
accident compensation scheme came into force’10. However, some such cases are now being 
presented before the Courts.11  In B v WDHB,12 the plaintiffs are seeking compensation for a fourth 
                                                 
5   Gerald Robertson et al, ‘Legal Norms Relevant to the Practice of Human Genetics: A Background Paper’ 
(1995) 3 Health Law Journal 187, Mark Strasser,  ‘Misconceptions and Wrongful Birth – a Call for 
Principled Jurisprudence’  (1999) 31 Arizona State Law Journal 21,  Brenda McGivern  ‘Tortious Liability 
for (selected) Genetic Harm: Exploring the Arguments’ (2002) 10 Torts Law Journal 4. 
6  Becker v Schwartz 413 NYS 2d 895, 907 (1978). 
7  Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital WHS Trust  [2001] EWCA 530 para 46. 
8  [2001] EWCA (Civ 1522) (18 October 2001). 
9  Ibid  para 28. 
10  Bryan v Philips New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 632, 640, relating to a claim of cancerphobia,  
 resulting from exposure to asbestos. 
11  A New Plymouth woman is suing a doctor for $50,000 for pain and suffering caused when she became 
pregnant after a failed sterilisation operation five years ago. ‘Doctor sued over failed sterilisation’  New 
Zealand Herald (Auckland), Thursday March 21 2002, 1. 
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child, which was conceived as a result of a failed vasectomy.  They allege that the pregnancy was 
caused by a lack of informed consent, in that had they been advised that the vasectomy might fail 
they would not have consented to the operation.  They do not claim that the operation was 
performed negligently.  The case was an application by the defendants to have the claim struck out. 
 
The first hurdle facing the plaintiffs in such a case in New Zealand is the Accident Compensation 
bar, which prevents claims for personal injury. The Accident Insurance Act 1998 contains a wider 
bar than was included in previous legislation, through the operation of ss 7(2) and 394(1), which 
say: 
 
s 7(2) This act also continues the existing restrictions on any such person seeking to 
obtain compensatory damages for the personal injury through any proceedings 
in a New Zealand court. 
 
s 394(1) No person may bring proceedings independently of this Act, whether under any 
rule of law or any enactment, in any court in New Zealand, for damages arising 
directly or indirectly out of – 
 
(a) personal injury covered by this Act; or 
(b) personal injury covered by the former Acts 
 
Section 39(1) sets out the requirements for cover. 
 
s 39(1) Cover for personal injury suffered in New Zealand (except mental injury caused 
by certain criminal acts) 
 
An insured has cover for a personal injury if – 
 
(a) He or she suffers the personal injury in New Zealand on or after 1 July 
1999; and 
 (b) The personal injury is any of the kinds of injuries described in section 
29(1)(a), (b), or (c); and 
 (c) The personal injury is described in any of the paragraphs in subsection (2).  
 
In B v WDHB the vasectomy occurred before 1 July 1999. However, the transitional provisions in 
the Act provide that, if the injury was suffered before 1 July 1999 and no claim has been lodged, 
then cover is to be determined under the current Act.13 
 
Section 29 defines ‘personal injury’ as follows: 
 
Personal injury means – 
 
(a) The death of an insured; or 
(b) Physical injuries suffered by an insured, including for example, a strain or a sprain; 
or 
(c) Mental injury suffered by an insured because of physical injuries suffered by the 
insured. 
 
The key issue in the proceedings was whether the harm suffered by the plaintiffs amounted to 
‘physical injuries’. Section 39 provides for cover for personal injury caused by medical misadventure 
                                                                                                                                                     
12  (Unreported, High Court, Wellington, Master Thomson 24 October 2001) CP No 4/01. 
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suffered by the insurer. The term “medical misadventure” is defined in the Act to include medical 
error and medical mishap.  The definition of medical error extends to include a negligent failure to 
obtain informed consent.14 In a number of New Zealand decisions it has been concluded that 
pregnancy is not a personal injury by accident.15 The reasoning behind these decisions is that 
pregnancy can not be considered to be an injury, as it is a natural physiological function.  In 
addition, there is no direct causal link between the pregnancy and the medical treatment received.  
The pregnancy was caused by intervening factors such as sexual intercourse. 
 
The Master held that while the position of the father regarding physical injury was debatable, the 
mother was entitled to commence common law proceedings. This is because, while she is an 
insured person under the Accident Insurance Act 1998, she suffered no personal injury caused by 
medical misadventure as defined by s39 (2)(b), because she did not suffer ‘personal injury caused 
by medical misadventure suffered by the insured’.  The insured is the father as it was he, not the 
mother, who received treatment. Section 36 provides as follows: 
 
s 36 Medical error.  
 
(1) Medical error means the failure of a registered health professional to observe a 
standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstances. 
 
(2) Such a failure includes a registered health professional’s negligent failure to, for 
example,  
(a) obtain informed consent to treatment from – 
(i) The insured to whom the treatment is given; or 
(ii) The insured’s parent, legal guardian, or welfare guardian, as appropriate, if the 
insured does not have legal capacity; or… 
 
Thus section 36(2)(a)(i) refers to the father not the mother, and as the mother was not covered by 
the Accident Insurance Act, she is able to sue at common law.  
 
B v WDHB was reheard before Gendall J as an application to review the decision of the Master’s 
refusal to strike out the proceedings.16  Gendall J agreed with the Master, stating that the wife did 
not suffer medical misadventure, as she was not a patient. Nor was she someone to whom any 
treatment was given.  He doubted that conception, where it arose out of a natural process, could be 
described as a personal injury.  With respect to the husband, he held that he did not suffer a 
personal injury.  The husband neither conceived nor gave birth, and he did not suffer any personal 
injury by virtue of any surgery.  The Judge agreed with the Master that, given the uncertain state of 
the law regarding damages for the birth of a child, it was inappropriate to strike the action out.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
13  Section 423. 
14  Sections 34 and 36. 
15  DK v ARCIC  [1995] NZAR 529, Bell v ARCIC (98/99), 13 March 1996, Pritchard v ARCIC (Decision No 
104/96) 3 October 1996, MT v ARCIC (Decision No 91/96) 27 August 1996 and MM v ARCIC (Decision 
No 79/96) 27 August 1996. 
16  SGB v WDHB (Unreported, High Court, Wellington CP 4/01, 15 February 2002, Gendall J.) 
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The case does not address the issue as to whether damages for the cost of raising a child will be 
allowed in New Zealand. The case will now proceed to a substantive hearing, assuming that it is not 
settled in the meantime. With respect to damages for raising the child, the question will be whether 
the New Zealand courts will adopt the reasoning of the House of Lords in McFarlane v Tayside 
Health Board,17 a decision which has lead one commentator to state,  ‘I can think of few decisions 
that are – to their very core – as odious, unsound, and unsafe as this one’18. 
 
 
THE ENGLISH APPROACH 
 
Cases of this kind first came before the English Courts less than 20 years ago.  Until McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board,19 there was a trend in England and Scotland toward allowing damages, both 
for the pain and distress of an unplanned pregnancy and birth, and the cost of rearing the resulting 
child. 
 
In Udale v Bloomsbury Area Health Authority20 a woman’s sterilisation failed, a healthy child was 
born and a second operation performed.  Negligence was admitted and damages awarded, which 
included pain and suffering and loss of earnings during pregnancy, damages for disturbance to the 
family finances relating to the provision of a layette and increased accommodation for the family.  
However Jupp J, rejected a claim for the future costs of the child’s upbringing on grounds of public 
policy.  His reasons were, that it was undesirable that a child should learn that a court had declared 
its life to be a mistake, the difficulty of setting off the joy of having a child against the cost of rearing, 
and the risk that doctors might encourage abortion in order to avoid claims against them for medical 
negligence. However, Udale was contrary to the trend of English and Scottish cases prior to that 
point. 
 
In Thake v Maurice21 a vasectomy was performed, the husband was advised that contraception 
was no longer necessary, but a child was born.  In a claim brought in contract and tort, Peter Pain J 
refused to follow Udale and allowed such a claim.  He found that there was no reason why public 
policy prevented the recovery of expenses arising from the birth of a healthy child.  He awarded 
damages for the expenses of the birth and the mother’s loss of wages, but refused damages for the 
pain and suffering of labour, stating that these were offset by the joy of the birth.  He did award 
damages for the child’s upkeep until its seventeenth birthday. He observed22 that social policy, 
which permitted abortion and sterilisation, implied that it was generally recognised that the birth of a 
healthy child was not always a blessing. The Court of Appeal 23 held that damages should be 
awarded for pain and suffering ‘per the majority’ in tort rather than contract. The joy of having the 
                                                 
17  Above n 3. 
18  Dr J Ellis Cameron-Perry  ‘Return of the burden of the “blessing”” (1999) 149 New Law Journal  1887.  
19  Above n 3. 
20  [1983] 1 WLR 1098, [1983] 2 All ER 522. 
21  Above n 1. 
22  [1986] QB 644, 666G. 
 5 
 
child could be set off against the time, trouble and care in the upbringing of the child, but not against 
pre-natal pain and distress. For these, damages should be awarded. 
 
In Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority24 a sterilisation 
operation failed and the resultant child was born with congenital abnormalities.  The court held that 
there was no rule of public policy that precluded recovery of damages for pain and suffering and for 
maintaining a child.  The Court of Appeal followed Peter Pain J, in holding that the loss recoverable 
extended to any reasonably foreseeable loss directly caused by the unexpected pregnancy.  Thus 
pregnancy was equated with personal injury, leading to consequential (as opposed to pure) 
economic loss, which includes upbringing costs.25  Although this case related to a child with a 
disability, it was subsequently considered binding with respect to claims by parents for wrongful 
birth of a healthy child. 
 
However Emeh predates the retreat from Anns v Merton London Borough Council26 which resulted 
from the decision of Murphy v Brentwood District Council.27  This has lead to judicial scepticism 
about an overarching principle for the recovery of new categories of economic loss. In order to 
create liability in respect of economic loss there must be a closer link between the act and the 
damage than foreseeability provides. There should be a relationship of neighbourhood or proximity 
between the person said to owe the duty and the person to whom it is alleged the duty is owed. 
That relationship depends on whether it is fair, just and reasonable for the law to impose the duty. 
The doctor must have assumed responsibility for the economic interest of the claimant and the 
claimant must accordingly have relied upon this.28 The duty of care of a doctor relating to the 
prevention of pregnancy may not necessarily include also avoiding the costs of rearing the child if 
the child is born and accepted into the family. 
 
In Allen v Bloomsbury Health Authority29 a sterilisation operation was carried out, with the 
physicians having negligently failed to diagnose the fact that the mother was already four weeks 
pregnant.  Had she been made aware of her pregnancy at that time, she would have had it 
terminated. She claimed, inter alia, for the future maintenance of the resultant child who was 
healthy, except that she had a mild speech defect and mild dyslexia.  In awarding costs and 
expenses to bring up the child until she was 18 years old, Brooke J stated that recoverable 
damages were justified under two distinct categories: one for personal injuries to the mother arising 
out of the failed procedure and the pregnancy itself; the other for the economic loss sustained by 
the family.30  However, this division was disapproved of by the Court of Appeal in Walkin v South 
                                                                                                                                                     
23  [1986] 1 All ER 497. 
24  [1985] QB 1012, [1985] 2 WLR 233, [1984] 3 All ER 1044. 
25  Angus Stewart, QC ‘Damages for the Birth of a Child’  (1995) 49 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 
298, 300. 
26  [1978]  AC 728. 
27  [1991] 1 AC 398. 
28  Above n 25. 
29  [1993] 1 All ER 651. 
30  Ibid  658. 
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Manchester Health Authority,31 where it was held that the wrongful birth claim could only be justified 
as an action ‘arising from the infliction of a personal injury’32.  A claim for the economic loss caused 
by the birth of a child could not give rise to an independent cause of action.  Neill LJ stated that ‘the 
claim for financial loss cannot be separated from a claim for the physical injury’33. 
 
In Allan v Greater Glasgow Health Board34 Lord Cameron of Lockbroom rejected the argument that 
public policy prevented a claim for the pain and distress of pregnancy and birth.  He could see no 
reason why the cost of rearing should not, in principle, be provided for.  He stated ‘The question at 
the end of the day must be whether what is sought by way of reparation can be regarded as 
reasonable having in mind the particular circumstances of the particular case’35. 
 
However in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,36 the House of Lords reversed the trend outlined 
above, in deciding that damages could not be recovered for the costs of rearing a healthy child.  
There was a substantial divergence of approach by the respective judges, with no single distinct 
line of reasoning. Lord Slynn considered that the mother was entitled to general damages for the 
pain and discomfort of the pregnancy and birth, and special damages by way of medical expenses, 
clothes for her, and equipment needed on the birth of the baby.  She would also have been entitled, 
had she claimed for it, to compensation for loss of earnings due to the pregnancy and birth.  He saw 
no room for an argument that her decision not to have an abortion constituted a break in the change 
of causation, or made the damage too remote.  He considered the approach of offsetting the 
presumed benefit of the child against any damages too unwieldy. He awarded only those damages 
immediately associated with the pregnancy and birth. Lord Slynn did not accept the public policy 
argument that it was undesirable for children to learn that their birth was not wanted, by discovering 
that a damages claim had been made. Neither did he accept that such damages claims would lead 
to the medical profession encouraging late abortions.  He did accept that the loss associated with 
the costs of raising the child was foreseeable, but he decided that the medical practitioner’s duty of 
care could not, applying the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ limb of the test prescribed by Lord Bridge in 
Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman,37 extend to responsibility to avoid the costs of rearing a child.  It 
was, he said, a matter of inherent limitation of the liability of the doctor, rather than a public policy 
question. 
 
Lord Steyn held that damages in that case should be limited to pain and suffering for the pregnancy 
and birth, and loss of income during pregnancy.   He stated that the claim for the cost of bringing up 
the child was supportable from a corrective justice perspective. Corrective justice requires someone 
who has harmed another without justification to indemnify the other. Distributive justice requires a 
focus on the just distribution of burdens and losses among members of a society. He held that if a 
                                                 
31  [1995] 4 All ER 132. 
32  Ibid  145. 
33  Ibid. 
34  1998 SLT 580. 
35  Ibid 585 D-E. 
36  Above  n 3. 
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distributive justice approach were taken, the instinctive response of the average person would be 
that the parents ought not to be compensated for having a healthy child; and the latter approach 
was, in his view, the real basis for denying such claims.  Applying such a distributive justice 
approach, which, he maintained, did not involve reliance on public policy grounds, he decided that 
tort law did not permit recovery of the costs of upbringing in the case of a healthy child.  As a 
secondary basis for his decision, he determined that the claim did not meet the Caparo v Dickman38 
requirement of being fair, just and reasonable. 
 
Lord Hope of Craighead considered that recovery should be allowed for the pain and suffering 
involved in the pregnancy and the birth, and that there should be no set-off against such damages 
for the pleasure to be derived from the child.  He considered that normal rules as to the remoteness 
of damage should apply, so that such claims did not necessarily terminate at the moment of birth. 
With respect to the question of how child-rearing costs should be treated, Lord Hope stated that he 
did not rely on policy grounds, which were matters for the legislature.  He, like Lord Slynn, referred 
to the Caparo v Dickman test, but in a somewhat different way.  He stated that the benefits of 
having a child ought to be brought to account, as to fail to do so was not fair, just or reasonable.  
However, since the value of the benefit could not be calculated (unlike the economic costs of 
rearing the child), it was impossible to say that the costs exceeded the benefits.  They could not, 
therefore, be recovered. 
 
Lord Clyde also stated that he did not rely on public policy arguments, because for every argument 
there was a counter-argument.  Nor did he support the concept of set-off of the benefit of 
parenthood against the costs of child-rearing. His reasons were, in part, because it was 
inappropriate to seek to set off non-economic gain against economic loss and, in part, because the 
uncertainty of the benefit made the attempt at set-off impracticable.  He stated that damages are 
intended to achieve restitution and based on this, he concluded that the mother was entitled to 
recover for the pain and suffering associated with the pregnancy and birth.  However, he held that 
to relieve the parents of the financial obligations of rearing their child, while permitting them to 
continue enjoyment of it did not constitute a reasonable restitution.  Nor was the expense of child 
rearing proportionate to the doctor’s culpability.  It was, therefore, appropriate to limit damage so as 
to provide a proper measure of restitution. 
 
Lord Millett, while accepting that there was a strong, direct and foreseeable causal connection 
between the defendant’s negligence and the costs of rearing the child, concluded that such costs 
were not recoverable.  He recognised that, in individual cases, the birth of a baby might not 
constitute a benefit, but stated that it was necessary that society as a whole regard the event as 
beneficial.  He held that the law should not allow parents to enjoy the advantages of parenthood 
while avoiding its disadvantages, as to do so would be ‘subversive of the mores of society’39.  This 
                                                                                                                                                     
37  [1990] 2 AC 605, 617-8. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Above n 3, 1006. 
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reasoning led him, unlike the rest of the Lords, to reject the claim for pain and suffering arising out 
of the pregnancy and delivery, which he characterised as part of the price of parenthood.  However, 
the parents were entitled to general damages in a modest sum to reflect the loss of their freedom to 
limit the size of their family.  In addition, if they had disposed of items bought for their other children 
on the strength of the negligent information given them, the cost of replacing those items would be 
recoverable. 
 
McFarlane has subsequently been held to have settled the issue of liability for the responsibilities 
consequential on the birth of a healthy child imposed on or accepted by the parents. In Greenfield v 
Irwin (a firm) and others,40 the mother attempted to claim for her loss of earnings following the birth, 
as she had given up work to look after the child.  It was held McFarlane applied and the claimant 
could not recover economic loss arising from the existence of a healthy child as a result of an 
unwanted pregnancy. 
 
In Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust,41 the child, who was 
conceived following a negligently performed laproscopic sterilisation, suffered from disabilities.  
Damages were awarded for the child’s special needs and care relating to his disability, but this did 
not extend to the basic costs of his maintenance. Brook LJ treated this as a claim for pure economic 
loss and identified from the recent decisions of the House of Lords five different techniques that 
might be used in deciding whether to allow a claim for damages of this sort. He concluded that none 
of the five mitigated against allowing the claim in these circumstances. Hale LJ held this as a claim 
which on ordinary principles of law would be recoverable. There was a duty of care to prevent 
pregnancy, this duty had been broken and the whole of this damage was the foreseeable 
consequence of the breach of duty.  
 
In Groom v Selby42 the claimant underwent a sterilisation operation.  The consultant failed to carry 
out a pregnancy test before operating.  Unknown to anyone, the claimant was about six days 
pregnant at that time.  The child was born prematurely and contracted salmonella meningitis 
following birth, leading to disabilities, the extent of which would only become apparent as the child 
matured. The abnormality would not have been detected in the foetus if the pregnancy had been 
diagnosed in the usual way.  The issue was whether the disabilities followed foreseeably from the 
unwanted conception, or whether the chain of causation had been broken by some new intervening 
cause during the pregnancy.  It was held that, although the condition developed after birth, this did 
not mean she was a healthy child as contemplated in McFarlane.  Brooke LJ felt that the principles 
of distributive justice as enunciated in McFarlane did not assist in this case, as lay people might well 
be divided in their opinions in such a case.  
 
                                                 
40  [2001] 1 WLR 1292. 
41  [2001] 3 All ER 97. 
42  [2001] EWCA Civ. 1522.  
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Hale LJ commented that she would not regard the costs of bringing up a child, who was born as a 
result of the negligence of another, as ‘pure’ economic loss.  She stated, ‘…rather, they are 
economic losses consequent upon the invasion of bodily integrity suffered by a woman who 
becomes or remains pregnant against her will’43.  She held that if a child is to be regarded as not 
healthy, the disability must be genetic, or arise from the processes of intrauterine development and 
birth.   
 
The comments of Hale LJ in both Parkinson and Groom v Selby, indicate a movement from 
McFarlane.  For her, a duty of care sufficient to impose liability existed because there had been an 
invasion of the mother’s autonomy.44  When the pregnancy has been wrongly caused,45 she 
interpreted the Judges in McFarlane (apart from Lord Slynn) as being concerned with ‘whether a 
particular type of damage is recoverable if the duty is broken’46.  She stated that the House of Lords 
had adopted a ‘solution of deemed equilibrium’ whereby the benefits and burdens of having a 
healthy child cancel each other out as a matter of law.47  For a disabled child, the ‘deemed 
equilibrium’ accounts for the ordinary costs of raising the child but not the ‘extra care and extra 
expenditure’ a disabled child requires.  She stated48 ‘[t]his analysis treats a disabled child as having 
exactly the same worth as a non-disabled child. It affords him the same dignity and status. It simply 
acknowledges that he costs more.’ 
 
She repeated the notion of deemed equilibrium in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS 
Trust.49 In that case the mother was disabled, in that she was severely visually handicapped. Her 
vision was worsening and she sought a sterilisation as she believed she would be unable to care 
for a child. The operation was performed negligently and she gave birth to a healthy child. There 
was a low risk that the child might have inherited retinitis pigmentosa. Hale LJ emphasised that the 
principle detriment suffered by those who become parents against their will is the legal and factual 
responsibility to look after the child. She stated that ‘just as the extra cost involved in discharging 
that responsibility towards a disabled child can be recovered, so too can the extra costs involved in 
a disabled parent discharging that responsibility towards a healthy child’50.  
 
Walker LJ agreed that the appeal should be allowed, based on there being nothing unfair, unjust, 
unreasonable, unacceptable or morally repugnant in permitting recovery of compensation for a 
limited range of expenses with a close connection to the mother’s disability. He disagreed with the 
deemed equilibrium theory of Hale LJ, stating that his interpretation of McFarlane was that the 
judges rejected such an approach.51  
 
                                                 
43  Ibid  para 31. 
44  Ibid  para 69. 
45  Ibid  para 74. 
46  Ibid  para 86. 
47  Ibid  paras 87-90. 
48  Ibid  para 90. 
49  [2002] EWCA Civ 88 (14 February 2002). 
50  Ibid para 23. 
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51  Ibid paras 35-38. 
Waller LJ would have dismissed the appeal, on the grounds that any exception to the rule in 
McFarlane, with respect to a healthy child must be examined with great care, taking into account 
how the ordinary person would perceive the fairness of the exception. He gave as an example the 
situation of a woman with several children, who is not disabled, but whose physical and mental 
health and family circumstances may be so fragile that the birth of another child, even if healthy, 
would create a crisis in heath terms for her. Waller LJ held that she is unable to recover damages 
for the care of the child. Consequently, on the basis of distributive justice, ordinary people would 
think it was not fair that a disabled person should recover when mothers who may in effect become 
disabled by ill health through having a healthy child would not.52 
 
This argument demonstrates the problem with McFarlane. The situation of the two mothers is 
comparable. However it might equally be argued that this is a good reason why both should be able 
to recover the expenses involved in raising the child. 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
There has been substantially less Australian judicial consideration of the extent to which damages 
may be awarded for the birth of a child than in the United Kingdom or United States. In Dahl  v 
Purnell,53 Pratt DCJ  allowed damages for pre-natal distress and the pain and suffering of the birth; 
the past and future costs of bringing up the child; out of pocket expenses in the form of amounts 
expended on maternity clothes and medical expenses, loss of consortium and an amount for the 
parents’ voluntary services, past and future, in caring for the child.  However, he reduced the last 
components by a quarter to reflect the intangible benefits of a healthy child.  He held that public 
policy considerations did not prevent the plaintiff’s claim.  Veivers v Connolly54 was a decision of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, and related to the birth of a severely disabled child to a woman who 
had suffered rubella during pregnancy.  Her claim was successful against her doctor, for failing to 
diagnose her rubella and for failing to warn her of the consequent risks to the foetus.  In CES v 
Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd,55 the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the primary 
question was whether negligent advice resulting in the loss of opportunity to terminate the 
pregnancy could give rise to a claim for damages, plus the question of what damages could be 
recovered.  Each of the three members of the Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion. 
 
Kirby P stated that in the English and American cases there was consensus to the extent that 
damages for pain and discomfort associated with the birth, the costs involved in the birth and loss of 
earning capacity resulting directly from the pregnancy and its immediate aftermath were 
recoverable.  He discounted the two public policy arguments against recovery for the economic 
costs of raising the child.  The first argument is the idea that a healthy child (at least) is a ‘blessing’ 
                                                 
52  Ibid paras 53-55. 
53  (1993) 15 QLR 33. 
54  [1995] 2 Qd R 326. 
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and should not result in damages. The second argument is that a child whose birth had led to such 
damages would suffer distress as a consequence of the realisation that its conception and birth 
were unwanted.  He considered that any difficulty in assessing damages should not mean such 
damages would not be awarded, as courts are frequently required to assess future economic and 
non-economic loss.  He considered that the decision whether to set off the benefit of a healthy child 
against the amount of damages depended on the facts of the individual case, pointing out that it 
should not be assumed that the birth of a healthy child is always a blessing. 
 
However, in order to achieve a majority approach, Kirby P agreed with Priestly JA’s approach to 
damages, which disallowed damages from the point at which adoption could have occurred.  
Meagher JA dissented, stating that he considered it abhorrent that the birth of a healthy child could 
lead to an award of damages.  He felt it might be damaging to the child to become aware that she 
was an unwanted child.  
 
Until this point, the Australian cases were in accord with those of the United Kingdom, in which the 
preponderance of cases had allowed damages for loss of earnings and the costs of raising a child. 
In  Melchior v Cattanach,56  the Queensland Court of Appeal had to decide whether to follow 
McFarlane. 
 
Melchior concerned a failed sterilisation operation, and the negligent failure of the patient’s health 
care provider to warn the mother that pregnancy might occur.  In the first instance,57 Holmes J 
declined to follow the House of Lord’s decision in McFarlane.  She stated that although McFarlane 
was persuasive, the judgments did not produce a consistent line of reasoning against awarding 
damages with respect to a healthy child.58  She proceeded to select from those judgments the 
reasoning that appealed to her as sound. 
 
With respect to the public policy arguments, she found the ‘blessing’ argument, applied as a social 
imperative, entails a ‘blunt intrusion of the individual decision-maker’s value system into legal 
reasoning’59.  She stated that the context in which a child is born might profoundly affect the 
happiness to be derived from his or her existence.  As such, the birth of a healthy child can not be 
stated to always be a blessing.  She additionally found difficulty in distinguishing between a healthy 
and unhealthy child.  She disapproved of the argument that it is deleterious for a child to know that 
it is unwanted.  She took the pragmatic view that ‘a child whose parents financial burden was 
ameliorated by an award would be in a considerably happier position than one whose parents were 
precluded by public policy from any relief’60. Overall, she felt that the competing views in McFarlane 
were insufficiently compelling to dictate a conclusion against the recovery of economic loss.  She 
                                                                                                                                                     
55  (1995) 38 NSWLR 47. 
56  [2001] QCA 246 (26 June 2001 unreported BC 2001 03372)(Qld CA). 
57  Melchior v Cattanach [2001] Aust Torts Reps 81-591 (Qld SC). 
58  Ibid  para 50. 
59  Ibid  para 51. 
60  Ibid  para 53. 
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was also unimpressed by Lord Steyn’s distributive justice approach in McFarlane, because of its 
inherent subjectivity.  She found that the failure to adopt out the child did not interrupt the chain of 
causation – it was a failure to intercept it.  She felt that there was no guarantee that adoption would 
be less catastrophic in its consequences than the decision to keep the child.61  She was 
unimpressed by the ‘fair, just and reasonable’ test proposed by Lords Slynn and Hope in McFarlane 
stating, 
 
Although one seeks, of course, to arrive at an imposition of liability which is fair, just and reasonable, 
to use that desired result as a test by which the initial questions – is there a duty and, if so, how far 
does it extend – can be answered, is an unsatisfactorily imprecise approach.62 
 
Holmes J declined to follow McFarlane, and made an award for special damages, past and future 
care, economic loss, the costs of raising the child and loss of consortium.  
 
On appeal, McMurdo P and Davies JA agreed with the primary judge, concluding that child rearing 
costs should be awarded and dismissed the appeal with costs.  Thomas JA disagreed.  The judges 
unanimously agreed that the primary judge’s findings as to negligence and causation should stand.  
McMurdo P found that the principles set out in the High Court relating to the recovery of pure 
economic loss63 supported the award of child rearing costs.  He rejected the benefit of parenthood 
argument, because in today’s Australian society children are not regarded as an economic asset 
and are not universally regarded as a blessing. Additionally, the free choice of the parents to limit 
the number of their children was taken from them by the doctor’s negligence.  The damages were 
for the loss flowing from the conception of the child caused by the appellant’s medical negligence 
and the additional financial burden that will be placed on the family, rather than for the wrongful 
birth or new life of the child.  He noted that not every failed sterilisation will lead to damages, only 
those where negligence has caused the pregnancy.  This will involve a relatively small and 
determinate class of claimants and the resulting damages will be limited to the moderate 
reasonable costs of child rearing.  
 
Davies JA concurred, acknowledging that the birth of a child is not always a blessing.  He found no 
policy factors that ought to preclude recovery of the cost of maintaining the child during the period 
of minority.  He concluded that a set-off of the emotional benefits against the cost of raising the 
child should not be permitted, as to permit a contest about the benefits and burdens of a child would 
be morally offensive. Thomas JA dissented, stating that the benefits of a healthy child should be 
brought into account and he concluded that the ‘limited damages rule’ in force in most parts of the 
United States and also in the United Kingdom best fits the standards and expectations of Australian 
society.64 
 
                                                 
61  Ibid  para 57. 
62  Ibid  para 60. 
63  Perre v Appand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 189, 191. 
64  See the reasons for such a rule summarised at para 169. 
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An important feature of the majority decisions is the rejection of the concept that litigation would 
adversely impact on the child.  They pointed to the fact that litigating that conception was unwanted 
did not indicate necessarily that the child was unwanted.  This is supported by the fact that the loss 
claimed is pecuniary.  They pointed out that the financial gains from successful litigation would be 
beneficial to the child’s welfare. 
 
The New South Wales Supreme Court in Edwards v Blomeley 65 reviewed the English cases. 
Studdert J stated that the High Court has not yet had occasion to consider whether the costs of 
rearing a child in a ‘wrongful birth’ case are recoverable as damages in a claim by the parents of 
the child. However he did conclude that this review ‘indicates that in an action brought by the 
parents for ‘wrongful birth’, some damages are recoverable to compensate for the past costs and 
the ongoing costs of caring for a child born disabled’66. He stated that the measure of damages is 
unsettled at the present time. 
 
 
THE POSITION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
In Canada the matter does not appear to have been directly considered at appellate level. However, 
Lax J in the Ontario Court (General Division) in a carefully considered judgment held in a case of 
failed sterilisation, that child rearing costs were pure economic loss and were not generally 
compensable because the birth of the child was not an injury and brought the family many benefits. 
Further, the parents were not prevented from fulfilling their parental responsibilities and the 
relationship of mutual support and dependency which arose on the birth of the child was not 
compromised.67  
 
By contrast, in South Africa, a husband as administrator of his joint estate with his wife, brought an 
action for damages for breach of contract arising out of the performance of a failed sterilisation 
procedure on his wife.  The Appellate Division of five judges allowed the claim for the financial cost 
of rearing the child, but limited it to cases where the sterilisation procedure was performed for 
socio-economic reasons.68 This was contrasted with sterilisation solely in order to limit reproductive 
capacity. 
 
In the United States, the issue is a state not a federal matter and different states have taken 
different approaches.  As a broad generalisation it can be said that the majority of jurisdictions have 
taken an approach consistent with that of the House of Lords, disallowing claims for damages for 
the costs of rearing and educating children born after a negligent sterilisation procedure. The most 
                                                 
65  [2002] NSWSC 460 (12 June 2002) per Studdert J. This case is one of three unsuccessful cases heard 
on  11 and 12 March 2002 relating to wrongful life, where the child is seeking damages in consequence of 
a failure to prevent the child from being born. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Kealey v Berezowski (1996) 136 DLR 4th 708,741. 
68  Administrator, Natal v Edoward (1990) (3) SA 581. 
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common reasons have been because of the public policy consideration that parents cannot be said 
to have been damaged by the birth of a healthy, normal child.69 The following cases demonstrate 
the diversity of approach taken in the United States. 
 
In a case of wrongful conception following a negligent and failed sterilisation, the United States 
Court of Appeals, District of Colombia Circuit, noted, without finally deciding the question, that, 
‘when a couple has chosen not to have children, or not to have any more children, the suggestion 
arises that for them, at least, the birth of a child would not be a net benefit.  That is their choice and 
the courts are required to respect it’70. In other instances, where a couple chooses sterilisation for 
therapeutic or eugenic reasons, the birth of a healthy child, though unplanned, would be a great 
benefit and a court may feel it is unjust to impose on a defendant doctor the costs of raising the 
child.71 ‘Generally, however, the plaintiff’s recovery will most accurately reflect the amount of injury 
incurred if it is limited to paying for those risks that the plaintiff specifically sought to avoid and that 
came to pass’72. Ms Hartke had undertaken the sterilisation procedure because she feared that 
serious complications from a pregnancy could lead to her death. Once those dangers passed, 
having a child was a positive experience. The birth of the child was not an injury and to award her 
child-rearing expenses would be a windfall, which should not be allowed. 
 
In Lovelace Medical Center v Mendez,73 the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the right of 
parents of a healthy baby conceived after a negligently performed sterilisation procedure to recover 
the reasonable costs of raising the baby to adulthood.  For the public policy reasons of, ‘the 
unseemly spectacle of the parents’ attempting to prove how slight or non-existent was the 
psychological benefit they derive from their additional child in order to minimise the offset to their 
non-pecuniary interests’, the court declined to set off an amount representing the emotional benefits 
from having an additional healthy child against the economic costs of rearing the child. 
 
In Sherlock v Stillwater Clinic,74 the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered a claim brought by Mr 
and Mrs Sherlock, who had seven children and wanted no more, for the reasonable costs of rearing 
a child born after a negligently performed sterilisation procedure.  The court held, in a 3-2 decision, 
that public policy considerations cannot properly be used to deny the recovery of all damages 
proximately caused by a negligently performed sterilisation that was indistinguishable from ordinary 
medical negligence: 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
69  See for example, Terrell v Garcia, 496 SW 2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), Rieck v Medical Protective Co of 
Fort Wayne Ind, 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d, 242 (1974), Cockrum v Baumgartner  95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 
N.E. 2d 385, 69 Ill. Dec. 168 (Ill. 1983), McKernan v Aasheim, 102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P. 2d 850 (Wash 
1984) and Girdley v Coats 825 S.W. 2d 295, 798 P. 2d 477 (1990). 
70  Hartke v McKelway 707 F2d, 1544 (1983), 1552. 
71  Ibid  1554. 
72  Ibid  1555. 
73  805, P2d 603 (NM 1991). 
74  260 NW 2d 169 (1977). 
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Where the purpose of the physician’s actions is to prevent conception or birth, elementary justice 
requires that he be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in fact occurred.  While 
other courts have referred to a negligent sterilisation case as a ‘wrongful birth’ action, we believe that 
this type of case is more properly denominated an action for ‘wrongful conception’, for it is at the point 
of conception that the injury claimed by the parents originates.75 
 
After considering the disadvantages and assessing their role as a mortal attempt to do justice in an 
imperfect world, the court, by majority, concluded that the reasonably foreseeable costs of rearing 
the child are a direct financial injury to the parents and should be allowed, subject to an offset for 
the value of the benefits conferred to them by the child.  There should be strict judicial scrutiny of 
verdicts to prevent excessive awards. 
 
In Custodio v Bauer,76 the Californian Court of Appeal allowed the parents to claim damages under 
the Californian Civil Code for child raising expenses, where the child was conceived as a result of a 
failed sterilisation.  In Betancourt v Gaylor,77 the action was for damages for raising the child born 
after an allegedly negligently performed sterilisation.  On a motion brought by the defendants to 
dismiss the action, Loftus JCC refused summary judgment, noting that ‘any other loss or damage 
approximately resulting from the negligent sterilisation operation, including the costs, emotional 
upset and physical inconvenience of rearing a child, may be recovered at law’78. 
 
In Burke v Rivo,79 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a 4-3 decision, held that the 
parents of a child born after a failed sterilisation procedure could recover damages for the cost of 
rearing a normal, healthy, but (at least initially) unwanted child, if the reason for seeking sterilisation 
was founded on economic or financial considerations.  The benefit, if any, the parents receive from 
having the child should be offset against the cost of rearing the child.  There was no reason 
founded on sound public policy to immunise a physician from having to pay for a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of his negligence, or from a natural and probable consequence of a 
breach of his guarantee, namely the parents’ expenses of rearing the child to adulthood. 
 
Similarly, in Ochs v Borrell,80 the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a unanimous decision, allowed 
the parents to claim the costs of raising a child with some orthopaedic disabilities born after a 
negligent sterilisation procedure performed upon the mother.  The jury was entitled to award 
damages for child rearing expenses, reduced by the value of the benefits conferred on the parents 
by having and raising the child.  The court concluded that this could be dealt with on a case by case 
basis. 
 
 
                                                 
75  Ibid 174-175. 
76  251 Cal App 2d 303, 59 Cal Rptr 463, 27 ALR 3d 884(1967) 
77  136 N.J. Super. 69, 74, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).  
78  Ibid  340. 
79  551 NE 2d 1 (Mass 1990). 
80  187 Conn 253(1982). 
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DISABLED CHILD 
 
McFarlane was confined to the wrongful birth of a healthy child. In England the right remains to 
recover damages for the extra costs of raising a disabled child. A disabled child may be born as a 
result of negligence in two different types of situations.  The first is that the negligence could directly 
lead to the birth of a disabled child, where the purpose of the doctor/patient interaction is to avoid 
conception or birth. An example is the loss of opportunity to obtain an abortion, where a test for 
foetal abnormality is carried out negligently.  The second possibility is where the negligence 
incidentally leads to the birth of a disabled child, such as where a sterilisation fails, and the resulting 
child is unexpectedly born with a disability.   
 
It is necessary to determine the level of disability required before a child ceases to be a healthy 
child. In Parkinson,81 Hale LJ (with whom Brooke LJ agreed) attempted a definition.  She stated that 
any disability must be caused by the defendant’s negligence.  The disability must arise from the 
processes of conception, pregnancy or birth.  The cause of the disability must be ‘genetic’ or ‘the 
foreseeable processes of intra-uterine development and birth’82.  Otherwise the disability would not 
be sufficiently causally connected to the doctor’s negligence so as to give rise to the claim. 
 
Secondly, the disability must be ‘significant’.  It will not include ‘minor defects or inconveniences 
such are the lot of many children who do not suffer from significant disabilities’83. Thirdly, Hale LJ 
relied on the definition of a disabled child in s17(11) of the Children’s Act 1989: 
 
A child is disabled if he is blind, deaf or dumb or suffers from a mental disorder of any kind or is 
substantially and permanently handicapped by illness, injury or congenital deformity or such other 
disability as may be prescribed… 
 
This concept of a ‘healthy child’ is an artificial notion.  It is difficult to distinguish between the healthy 
and the unhealthy, and decide the level and type of disability necessary before the healthy child 
who is a blessing becomes a disabled child who is a burden.  Holmes J, in Melchior v Cattanach,84 
stated that the drawing of such distinctions is unattractive.  This issue led McMurdo P in the 
Queensland Court of Appeal to state 85  
 
… it is offensive and wrong to suggest that children born with disabilities, even severe disabilities, 
cannot enrich the lives of their parents, family and the wider community in diverse ways.  If the 
benefits argument is valid it must apply to all children whether born with disabilities or the respect to 
which all human life is entitled will be devalued. 
 
                                                 
81  Above n 41. 
82  Above n 41, 92 and Groom v Selby above n 42, 32. 
83  Above n 41, 52. 
84  Above n 57. 
85  Above n 56. 
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Davies JA thought that to limit the damages for maintenance of a disabled child to the extra cost of 
maintaining such a child is both illogical and unfair.86 In addition, there seems little reason to limit 
liability for the maintenance of a severely disabled child to damages for the period of childhood.87 
The responsibilities and burdens of the parents may well continue into the adult life of such a child, 
who may never be able to live independently. 
 
 
PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS 
 
The principal argument against awarding damages for the upbringing of a child conceived as a 
consequence of medical negligence, is that the birth of a normal healthy child is a blessing and a 
benefit to both parents and society and so not a matter for compensation.  In McFarlane,88 Lord 
Millett held that the law must take the birth of a normal healthy baby to be a blessing, not a 
detriment.  This view has been criticised as ‘Lord Millett borrowing a page or two from Sophocles, 
from Lord Gill and (it would seem) from some tenderer-than-thou book of soft core philosophy’89. 
 
Children are no longer universally regarded as a blessing.  Indeed, it is doubtful whether they ever 
were.  Children are not economic assets, they are financial liabilities for many years.90  Society 
accepts that individuals may limit their fertility by way of contraception and sterilisation.  In fact, 
many people would say that responsible human beings ought to manage their reproductive 
outcomes, with a view to promoting the overall financial and emotional stability of their family.  As 
was stated by McMurdo P in Melchior v Cattanach,91 ‘It is self evident that it is in society’s interests 
to encourage the nurturing of children within families, but I do not see that this is achieved by 
refusing moderate and reasonable economic loss caused by professional negligence.’  He felt that 
the award of damages would benefit society by encouraging the raising of the child within the family 
unit. 
 
The benefit argument sets off the joys and pleasures of parenthood against the economic loss of 
raising the child, so as to extinguish the loss.  This approach involves attempts to establish the 
benefit and burden for each child.  Such a calculation would require an argument that a particular 
child would be more of a burden than a benefit so as to avoid offsetting.  In addition, the so-called 
‘benefits’ of parenting were exactly what the plaintiffs sought to avoid by undergoing a sterilisation 
procedure, especially if it was undergone for socio-economic reasons. The benefits of parenting are 
                                                 
86  Ibid  96. 
87  Edwards v Blomeley [2002] NSWSC 460 (12 June 2002) para 112, ‘It is not to be assumed that a claim 
available to parents of a disabled child must be limited to the period of the child’s minority.’ 
88  Above n 3. 
89  Above n 18, 1887. 
90  See the discussion of the cost to women of child rearing in ‘The Staple Inn Reading: “The Value of Life 
and the Cost of Living- Damages for Wrongful Birth.’” Rt Hon Lady Justice Hale DBE. 
www.actuaries.org.uk/library/staple_inn_read_2001.pdf.  
91  Above n 56, 52. 
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not similar in kind to economic loss and so it is inappropriate to offset the two.  General non-
pecuniary damages should not be offset against general pecuniary damages.92 
 
A further public policy argument is that the child concerned may discover that it was unwanted and 
its upbringing paid for by another and that the child might be psychologically harmed by discovering 
it is an ‘emotional bastard’.  This argument ignores the reality that many people may be aware that 
their conception was unplanned.  This does not necessarily result in an unloved child; rather it is the 
social and economic consequences of the birth that are the factors that are undesired.  To limit the 
financial disadvantages to the family may indeed have the effect of ameliorating the effects of a 
child who might otherwise cause limitations, or even hardship, to the family. 
 
In Udale,93 Jupp J. was concerned that a mother who accepted and loved the child following its birth 
would get little or no damages because her love and care for her child and her joy, ultimately, at its 
birth would be set off against, and might cancel out the inconvenience and financial disadvantages 
which naturally accompany parenthood. In contrast, a woman who nurtured bitterness in her heart 
and refused to let her maternal instincts take over would be entitled to large damages. In short, 
virtue would go unrewarded and unnatural rejection of womanhood and motherhood would be 
generously compensated. This argument can be countered by stating that the financial costs of 
raising the child may well be the same for both mothers. No doubt many mothers in this situation 
will make the best of the situation and love their child, whilst still resenting the financial and 
emotional disadvantages they have suffered. The award of damages in this situation should not 
relate to judgments about the moral praiseworthiness of a particular mother. The mother who is less 
accepting is not necessarily a bad person, her attitude may be a reflection of the totality of her 
circumstances.  
 
It is notable that in McFarlane, the judges maintained that public policy took no part in the search for 
a solution, it was based on legal policy.94  Lord Hope of Craighead said that the question for the 
court was ultimately one of law, not of social policy.95  Lord Steyn likened public policy arguments to 
‘quicksands’96 and Lord Clyde recalled that public policy was long ago realised as ‘a very unruly 
horse, and when once you get astride of it you never know where it will carry you’97. Lord Millett 
said that limitations in the scope of legal liability arose from legal policy where what was in issue 
was the admission of a new head of damages, or the admission of a duty of care in a new situation.  
Legal policy in this sense was not the same as public policy, even though moral considerations may 
play a part in both.98 Lord Clyde pointed out that a solution was unlikely to be derived in a setting in 
which each side could point to public policy issues with, for every argument, a reasonable counter-
                                                 
92  Brenda McGivern  ‘Tortious liability for (selected) genetic harm: Exploring the arguments’ 10 Torts Law 
Journal 4, 38. 
93  [1983] 1 WLR 1098,1109D-F. 
94  See [1999] 4 All ER 961, 972, 978, 993-994, 1000,  [2000] AC 59, 76, 83, 100, 108. 
95  [1999] 4 All ER 961, 988. 
96  Ibid  978. 
97  Ibid  994. 
98  Ibid  1000. 
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argument.99 With respect, this is undoubtedly correct, although similar comment might be made 
about the distributive justice approach proposed by Lord Steyn. 
 
 
THE POSITIVE MORALITY APPROACH 
 
Lord Steyn proposed that the individual judge’s sense of the ‘moral answer to a question’ should 
prevail; ‘what may count in a situation of difficulty and uncertainty is not the subjective view of the 
judge but what he reasonably believes that the ordinary citizen would view as right’100.  Replacing 
the man on the Clapham omnibus with commuters on the London Underground, he formed the view 
that an overwhelming number of ordinary men and women would conclude that the parents of an 
unwanted but healthy child should not be able to sue the doctor or hospital for compensation for the 
cost of raising the child.  If it were necessary he would also conclude that the claim does not satisfy 
the requirement of  ‘fair, just and reasonable’101.  As was stated by Hale LJ in Parkinson102 
 
The traveller on the Underground is not here being invoked as a hypothetical reasonable man but as a 
moral arbiter.  We all know that London commuters are not a representative sample of public opinion.  
We also know that the answer will crucially depend upon the question asked and the amount of 
relevant information and argument given to help answer it.  The fact that so many eminent judges all 
over the world have wrestled with this problem and reached different conclusions might suggest that 
the considered response would be less emphatic and less unanimous. 
 
 
A fundamental underlying precept in McFarlane is the belief in the preciousness of human life. 
However, as has been stated by Seymour,103 such a perspective is increasingly likely to be 
rejected. He suggests that if a woman should be free to decide all matters relating to childbearing, 
then a woman should be free to control her fertility and can legitimately claim to have suffered harm 
if her exercise of that freedom has been thwarted by medical negligence.  
 
Although the judges in McFarlane pay lip service to the rights of individuals to make choices to limit 
the sizes of their families, they fail to protect the exercise of such rights.  One might doubt the 
frequency with which their Lordships travel on the London Underground and their familiarity with the 
opinions of such travellers, especially those with limited economic or emotional resources.  They 
appear to find morally distasteful the concept that the community generally accepts that an 
individual may make a legitimate choice that the birth of a child will not be a blessing. It seems 
illogical and unfair to deny recovery of the costs of maintaining the child born as a consequence of 
a doctor’s negligence. 
                                                 
99  Ibid  993. 
100  Ibid  897. 
101  Ibid  977-978. 
102  Above n 41, 82. 
103  John Seymour, ‘Actions for Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life’ New Zealand Bioethics Journal  
 February 2001, 26,31. 
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GENDER ISSUES 
 
Hale LJ has suggested that the issues relating to wrongful birth are questions that men and women 
may look at differently,104 whilst accepting that there is just as much diversity of view among women 
as there is among men. In many of the decided cases, the judges have emphasised the pain and 
suffering of pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast, they give scant consideration to the profound and 
lasting changes to a woman’s life resulting from pregnancy and childbirth. In reality, the latter 
effects are the more significant, as such effects last for the remainder of the woman’s life. Hale LJ 
does not regard the upbringing of a child as pure economic loss, but rather loss that is consequent 
on the invasion of bodily integrity and loss of personal autonomy involved in an unwanted 
pregnancy. She regards the loss of autonomy as consisting principally in the resulting duty to care 
for the child, rather than simply to pay for its keep. She points to the physical changes consequent 
on pregnancy and birth, some of which are permanent. She also refers to psychological changes 
and also the severe curtailment of personal freedom during the pregnancy. She notes that giving 
birth is hard work, often painful and sometimes dangerous. The effects are long lasting. The 
personal obligations continue throughout the childhood involving work, loss of freedom and 24 hour 
responsibility.  She states:  
 
All of these consequences flow inexorably, albeit to different extents and in different ways according to 
the circumstances and characteristics of the people concerned, from the first: the invasion of bodily 
integrity and personal autonomy involved in every pregnancy. This is quite different from regarding 
them as consequential upon the pain, suffering and loss of amenity experienced in pregnancy and 
childbirth.105  
 
She points out that the law now recognises the claim of injured persons to be compensated for the 
costs of their care.106 If the care is provided by a family member, the claim is made by the injured 
person, but the loss is that of the family member. The family member has not been wronged. In a 
wrongful birth case the care is provided by the person who has been wronged and the legal 
obligation to provide it is the direct and foreseeable consequence of that wrong. She infers that 
claims for the wrongful conception and birth of healthy children could well be analysed in this way, 
as the courts have been prepared to do in cases concerning disabled children.107 
 
Raising children is expensive, particularly for the parent who looks after the child, usually the 
mother. In New Zealand, in 1999, women’s average hourly earnings were 81.2% of that of men. 
Women are twice as likely to work part-time than men are. 28.3% of all families in New Zealand are 
sole parent families, the majority headed by women. 91% of people receiving the Domestic 
                                                 
104  Above n 90, 20. 
105  Ibid  25. 
106  Ibid  24. 
107  Ibid  24-25. 
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Purposes sole parent benefit are women.108 It is clear that the gender earnings gap is largely 
caused by the responsibility for the care of children. As such, a child (or further child) may well not 
be a blessing to the individual mother. Additionally, it may not be a blessing to the community at 
large if they, through the payment of taxation, contribute to the maintenance of such a child. 
 
 
CONTRACT 
 
In McFarlane there are references to contract.  Lord Slynn said that if a client wants to be able to 
recover the costs of raising a child, he or she must do so by an appropriate contract. Lord Steyn 
stated that the outcome would depend on the terms of the contract that was alleged to have been 
made.  He added that since a contract for services is usually involved, the term concerned might be 
an obligation to take reasonable care.  On the other hand, the terms may be expressed more 
stringently and may amount to a warranty of an outcome.109 
 
The Law Lords (apart from Lord Clyde) held it was not ‘fair, just and reasonable’ for the parents to 
recover the costs of rearing a healthy child.  In other words, the defendant did not owe a duty of 
care to prevent this economic loss. In a claim in contract, the action is complete on breach of 
contract.  The Court must then quantify the damages to be paid. As was stated by McMurdo P in 
Melchior v Cattanach,110 ‘… the answers to these questions are the same whether the claim is 
framed in tort or contract, provided of course in the latter case that the breach alleged is of an 
express or implied term to exercise reasonable care.’  The Courts have usually sought to assimilate 
the legal results in contract and negligence actions in the medical context. 
 
In an action in contract, a Court could conclude that the judgments in McFarlane are based on 
public policy and apply the same policy to a contract case.  Although some of the judges denied 
they were deciding the case on the basis of public policy,111 through the application of principles 
such as ‘distributive justice’, these bear a striking similarity to public policy arguments.  The difficulty 
that arises is whether public policy is available to deny recovery in a contract case.  The cases 
seem to relate public policy  (or illegality) to the validity or enforceability of the contract itself.112 In 
McFarlane, Lord Hope, in distinguishing Administrator, Natal v Edouard,113 stated that case 
depended on a strict interpretation of the rule as to the damages recoverable in contract, which has 
no part in the law relating to delictual liability for negligence. 
 
                                                 
108  The statistics are from ‘The Status of Women in New Zealand, 1998 CEDAW Report’, and ‘Briefing the 
Incoming Minister, 1999’, Ministry of Women’s Affairs. http://www.mwa.govt.nz 
109  Above n 3, 972. 
110  Above n 56, 2. 
111  Above n 3, 972, 978, 993. 
112  M. Furmston  (ed), The Law of Contract  (1999), Chapter 5. 
113  1930 (3) SA 581. 
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The main obstacle to a successful case in contract may be in establishing a detriment to justify 
damages.  If a child is taken to be a benefit, regardless of the actual effect on the particular parents, 
then the argument can be made that there is no loss and so no damages. 
 
In Thompson v Sheffield Fertility Clinic,114 a woman underwent in vitro fertilisation. She had only 
agreed to the replacement of two embryos, but the clinic replaced three.  In the event, she gave 
birth to healthy triplets.  She sued in contract and tort for the cost of raising an additional child.  On 
the preliminary question, it was held that as there had been a breach of contract, the issue was the 
terms of the contract.  The Court did not consider whether damages would be available for the birth 
of the extra child and the matter was settled before the issue was decided.115  Whether she could 
have recovered the costs of raising the extra child would depend on the specific provisions of the 
contract.  If the parties anticipated the breach and expressly dealt with who would pay for the 
financial consequences of the birth of the child, recovery would be likely.  However such a contract 
is unlikely.  Lord Steyn seemed to accept that liability in contract might arise where the terms of the 
contract amounted to a warranty of an outcome116 and so, in Lord Slynn’s words, the doctor will 
have ‘assume[d] responsibility for those economic losses’117. In SGB v WDHB118 a further cause of 
action has been added pursuant to the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, and so the issue of 
contract may yet fall to be decided in New Zealand. 
 
 
WHO CAN SUE? 
 
The issue is whether, if the negligent operation is performed on one parent, the other has the right 
to sue. The question is whether a duty of care is owed to that person.  In Goodwill v British 
Pregnancy Advisory Service,119 a man had undergone a vasectomy operation arranged by the 
defendants. He was advised that the operation had been successful and he would not need to use 
contraception in the future. Three years after the operation, he commenced a sexual relationship 
with the plaintiff.  Having been told of the permanency of the vasectomy, and being reassured by 
her doctor that the chances of pregnancy were remote, she did not use contraception.  She became 
pregnant and gave birth to a daughter.  The father was a married man, who was living with his wife 
and family.  It was held that the defendants were not in a sufficient or any special relationship with 
the plaintiff, such as gives rise to a duty of care.  At the time the advice was given to the father of 
the child, the defendants had no knowledge of the plaintiff, she was not an existing sexual partner 
of his, but was merely a potential future sexual partner.  In order to succeed, the plaintiff would have 
to prove, inter alia, that the defendant knew, either actually or inferentially, that the advice 
communicated was likely to be acted on by the plaintiff. In addition, that this action was without 
                                                 
114  (Unreported, High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Hooper J, 6 March 2001) – referred to in 
(2001) 9 Medical Law Review, 170-173. 
115  See ‘Mother of IVF Triplets settles for £20,000’ Guardian, 24 February 2001. 
116  Above  n 3, 972. 
117  Ibid.  
118  Above  n 16. 
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independent inquiry, for a purpose whether particularly specified or generally described, which was 
made known either actually or inferentially to the defendant at the time when the advice was given, 
and that it had been so acted upon by the plaintiff to her detriment. 
 
Consequently, the ability of a parent or other person with the responsibility to care for a child to 
make a claim will depend on proximity. The issue is the closeness of the relationship of the claimant 
to the doctor, such as being a known sexual partner of the patient. As was stated by Hale LJ in 
Parkinson, 120  ‘my tentative view is, however, that if there is a sufficient relationship of proximity 
between the tortfeasor and the father, who not only has, but meets his parental responsibility to 
care for the child, then the father too should have a claim.’ 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The approach of the English courts towards claims for the recovery of the costs of rearing a child 
born as a result of medical negligence is to disallow such expenses as would arise as a 
consequence of the birth of a healthy child, but to permit damages for the additional expenses 
incurred in the care of a disabled child. The comments of Hale LJ indicate that the English judiciary 
does not universally accept this view.121  The Queensland Court of Appeal, in order to avoid such 
distinctions between a child who is healthy and one who is disabled has allowed damages for child 
rearing where the pregnancy was a consequence of medical negligence.  
 
If the decision whether to allow such damages is to be based on subjective concepts, then it is 
preferable for Parliament to pass appropriate legislation, rather than the Courts deal out ‘palm tree 
justice’122. Public policy considerations might suggest that to allow such claims would potentially 
increase the risks, and so the costs, of medical practice. Equally, arguments could be made that it 
is distasteful to require parents to demonstrate that their child is defective, and thus unwanted, in 
order to recover damages. A person who seeks medical advice in order to avoid or terminate 
pregnancy has done so because they do not want a child, irrespective of the health of that child.123 
The point is that such a child would be a detriment for financial, emotional, or social reasons, even if 
the family loved and accepted the child. The parents have lost the autonomy to make the decision 
to limit their fertility and have consequently suffered loss. 
 
If it is accepted that New Zealand today is a liberal society where a plurality of values is accepted 
and protected,124 then it is difficult to formulate a basis for a ’community view’ that has some form of 
                                                                                                                                                     
119  [1996] 2 All ER 161. 
120  Above n 41, 93. 
121  Above n 90. 
122  Szechter (otherwise Karsov) v Szechter [1970] 3 All ER 905, 909. 
123  There are however, cases where the procedure was to avoid the birth of a child with a suspected defect 
and once the child is born healthy, it is a wanted child. In that case the parents have suffered no loss, if 
they wanted a healthy child, but not a disabled child. 
124  As in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
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special normative status. Such a view that provides a basis for a uniform public morality would 
enable the solution of issues by way of the positive morality approach. It is difficult to escape the 
notion that in McFarlane the views of the mythical commuter have, in reality, been substituted by 
the views of the judiciary, thus leading to a subjective decision- making process. 
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